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1  Introduction: mental state terms as sequential 
phenomena 
This article examines the interactive deployment of the mental state terms want 
and need in everyday family interaction and shows how the selection of these 
terms to build directives and requests is a sequential phenomenon. The article 
has two major concerns. First, it focuses on the broad theme of how psychology 
* The author would like to thank the members of the Discourse and Rhetoric Group at 
Loughborough University, particularly Derek Edwards and Alexa Hepburn, for their helpful 
discussion and comments.
can be understood as an object “in and for interaction” (Potter 2005: 739) and 
how psychological terms can be fruitfully examined as resources that accomplish 
particular actions in a range of interactional settings. I examine live interactional 
practices in which want and need regularly occur, specifically how speakers use I 
want to deliver directives and I need to build requests in specific, recurrent envi-
ronments to manage a range of contingencies and considerations. The second 
concern will be to extend work that has reported on the selection of syntactic 
format when building requests and directives (Aronsson and Cekaite 2011; Craven 
and Potter 2010; Curl and Drew 2008; Heinemann 2006; Lindström 2005; 
Vinkhuyzen and Szymanski 2005). The analysis draws on recent discursive psy-
chological work which examines “psychological” matters as they are described, 
invoked, and put to use by people themselves in situ as part of the social actions 
performed in and through everyday talk (e.g., see contributions in Hepburn and 
Wiggins 2007). The consideration of selection of these terms as interactional, 
 sequential phenomena has particular implications for a referential theory of lan-
guage that assumes that mental state terms emerge within talk as words that re-
flect inner mental states. 
1.1  Referentialism and Theory of Mind
A major assumption of much of social cognitive research is that mental state 
terms develop in language as names referring to inner mental experiences. A 
 major facet of this work is Theory of Mind, defined as a basic human competence 
to impute mental states to others, to recognize that others may have desires, be-
liefs, and intentions that differ from one’s own, and to use knowledge of others’ 
mental states to explain and predict their behavior. Proponents of Theory of Mind 
uncritically adopt a referential theory of meaning as it is assumed that there are 
close relations between particular linguistic and cognitive developments (Gopnik 
and Meltzoff 1986, 1987). 
In their seminal study of “how children talk about the mind,” Bartsch and 
Wellman (1995: 31) developed a coding scheme to identify “genuine references to 
psychological states.” They examine children’s uses of the term want for what 
these may reveal about children’s understanding of “desire.” Consequently, their 
coding scheme aims to identify utterances with “a focus on desire rather than on 
a specific action” (1995: 68). For example, requests for unattainable objects (such 
as where it is clear that a request will not be granted) are coded as contrastive and 
are cited as being particularly revealing about children’s understanding of desire 
states. Contrastive utterances, “those contrasting desire and outcomes, those 
contrasting desire with actions” (1995: 77), they argue, “demonstrate an under-
standing of desires as something like a personal disposition or experiential state” 
(1995: 79). In contrast, conversational uses are treated as uninteresting and are 
disregarded for the purposes of analysis.
Conversational uses are defined as the “simple, unadorned request for an 
object when the object was in plain view. Such a statement could too easily, in the 
absence of additional context or evidence, be a mere request for an object as in 
“Give me the ball” or even a polite version of “Hand me the ball” (1995: 67). In 
recent years there has been interest in how conversational input shapes Theory of 
Mind development (for a recent review, see Slaughter and Peterson 2012). Follow-
ing Bartsch and Wellman’s work, these studies of “maternal mental state talk” 
utilize coding schemes that differentiate “between uses of mental state terms that 
were genuine versus those that were conversational” (McElwain et al. 2011: 1299).
1.2  Discursive psychology: an interaction analysis
It has been noted that this “psychologized” conception of beliefs and desires as 
hidden mental states is inconsistent with how words about intentionality are 
used in everyday life (Leudar and Costall 2004). The notion that mental state ex-
pressions can be studied as matters oriented to in talk-in-interaction is a basic 
premise of discursive psychology (Edwards and Potter 2005). “Psychological” 
matters are not approached from an analysts’ perspective, rather the focus is on 
how psychological terminology is described, invoked, and put to use by people 
themselves in situ as part of the social actions performed in and through everyday 
talk.
Early work in discursive psychology reworked a range of standard psycho-
logical topics such as memory (Middleton and Edwards 1990), attitudes (Potter 
and Wetherell 1987), and “script knowledge” (Edwards 1994, 1995). Research has 
shown how activities such as “remembering” are inherently social (Middleton 
and Edwards 1990), rather than a record of events which is relayed by speakers. A 
second strand of work has focused on the “psychological thesaurus” and exam-
ines how categories that are conventionally treated as psychological are invoked 
and used in everyday and institutional interaction (Edwards 2005, 2006, 2008). 
This includes “psychological terminology” such as remember and jealousy (Shaw 
and Kitzinger 2007; Edwards 1995) as well as idiomatic and metaphorical terms 
such as to be honest, honest to God, and boiling angry (Edwards 2005; Edwards 
and Fasulo 2006). Edwards (2006) examines how the modal verb would is used in 
handling accountability by formulating a general disposition to act one way or 
another in the context of police interrogation. He shows how suspects recurrently 
state what they generally would or wouldn’t do as a basis for denying a specific 
accusation. Childs (2012) shows how speakers may formulate their “wants” as 
part of a two-part structure, I don’t want X, I want Y, which is recurrently delivered 
in two specific sequential environments which are following a proposal regarding 
the speaker’s future actions or a formulation of the speaker’s motivations. Across 
both subsets the second part of the structure I want Y decreases the likelihood of 
challenge by a co-interactant in third-turn position. Childs (2012: 15) argues that 
“rather than descriptions of pre-existing inner experiences, the I want construc-
tions examined here are best understood as formulations that are rhetorically 
organized to reject and undermine an alternative.”
1.3  Requests and directives in interaction 
Another tradition of work, pertinent to the analysis here, has examined the syn-
tactic forms speakers use when delivering requests and directives and how the 
grammatical format of these turns influences the trajectory of the ongoing se-
quence. Curl and Drew (2008) show how the selection between modal requests 
such as could you and requests prefaced by I wonder if display speakers’ assess-
ments of the likelihood that the request will be granted (or their entitlement to 
make the request) and understandings of the contingencies involved in the re-
cipient carrying out the projected action. They show that modal forms display 
greater entitlement to make a request than those prefaced by I wonder if. An I 
wonder if preface, they note, “is a way to display one’s lack of entitlement to hav-
ing a request granted or one’s awareness of the contingencies surrounding the 
granting of a request” (2008: 141). Rather than displaying entitlement to make a 
request or presuming that it will be granted, speakers simply “wonder” whether 
such a thing can be done. 
Craven and Potter (2010) examine the nature and design of directives as dis-
tinct from requests. Drawing on Curl and Drew’s analysis of entitlement and con-
tingency in types of request, they note that directives, typically delivered using an 
imperative format, are built as a telling rather than an asking. They show how “in 
directives, performing the stated action is not treated as contingent on the capac-
ity or desires of the recipient. At the same time, the lack of attention to issues of 
capacity and desire (by not embodying these issues in a modal request form) 
builds a strong display of the speaker’s entitlement to direct the recipient’s ac-
tions” (2010: 9). 
The following analysis draws on Curl and Drew’s (2008) notion of entitle-
ment and contingency in requests and Craven and Potter’s (2010) characteriza-
tion of directives as actions that embody no orientation to the recipient’s ability 
or willingness to carry out the requested action. The study develops work on the 
selection of request format and will consider the uses of the mental state terms 
want and need in the construction of directives and requests in family interaction. 
This is part of a broader program of work that considers questions of power and 
resistance and how social influence operates within the family (Craven and Potter 
2010; Hepburn and Potter 2011). 
1.4  Data and analysis 
The data were taken from two sources: media data taken from a series of “fly on 
the wall” documentary programs which each document the lives of a particular 
family over an extended period of time (the C4 and AAF corpuses) and a corpus of 
recordings of twenty-eight mealtimes made by two families, the “Potts” family 
and the “Crouch” family (all names are pseudonyms). The families were given a 
video camera for approximately one month and were asked to make recordings of 
ten to fifteen mealtimes. The families were given the option of deleting any re-
cordings before the end of the recording period, and ethical permission to include 
anonymized extracts in research meetings and publications was obtained from 
each participant. 
The analytic approach is located within the theoretical framework of dis-
cursive psychology, which focuses upon psychology as something displayed in 
talk-in-interaction (Potter 2005). The analysis draws on the rigorous analytical 
techniques of contemporary conversation analysis. Orthographic transcripts of 
each recording were generated and a broad search of materials was used to select 
a corpus of candidate requests and directives built using want and need as verbs. 
These examples were subsequently transcribed using the Jefferson notation sys-
tem (see Atkinson and Heritage 1984) as standard in conversation analysis (see 
the appendix for transcription details). 
2  Analysis
2.1 I want formatted directives 
There were ten instances of directives built using I want within the data corpus. 
As is usual in conversation analysis, my aim is to explicate the interactional work 
which is being managed by this expression. I show how directives built using I 
want invoke authority and mobilize the recipient’s obligation to the speaker while 
ostensibly orienting to the projected action as the recipient’s business. Thus I 
 argue that I want formatted directives are Janus-faced in that they have two con-
trasting aspects. On the one hand their action import is to tell rather than ask the 
recipient to do something, but on the other hand they ostensibly orient to option-
ality. In other words, they are produced as if they are refusable when in fact, nor-
matively, they are not. Before going on to consider these features I first outline the 
typical environments in which speakers frame directives using I want. 
2.1.1  Deferred action directives
There are several features that are typical of the interaction environment in which 
speakers build directives with I want. First, the format is selected when the 
 speaker is directing an interlocutor on something which is the recipient’s busi-
ness, rather than making a request on their own behalf, such as for assistance or 
permission. That is, the recipient is required to carry out some action rather than 
grant permission for the speaker to do so. 
Second, speakers build directives with I want when the projected action is 
deferred (Lindström 1989 as cited in Landqvist 2005) and the turn makes relevant 
a commitment to a future activity rather than immediate compliance. That is, the 
majority of examples concern an action which is to be carried out when the 
speaker will not be present. Several examples are given below. 
(1)  AAFE3 26:58
(Pat: mother; Grant: son, aged seventeen)
01 Pat: [((walks into room and puts hand on hip))]
02 Gra: [let’s get moving o:n ]
03 → Pat: oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt I want you to be 
04 back here by six.
05 (.)
06 Pat: ri:ght?
07 (.) 
08 Mar: [((walks past Pat out of room))]
09 (Mar): [ri:ght. ]
10 Kev: I’m not going any(way,) ((out of camera shot))
(2)  E4 16:20
(Jane: mother; Tom: son, aged fifteen)
01 Jan: WHE:RE YOU GOI:NG?
02 (1.0)
03 Tom: ( ) we’re not allowed to be in so we’re 
04 just gonna go:,
05 (1.0)
06 → Jan: I WANT YOU BACK BY SI:X, 
07 (2.0)
08 Tom:  I don’t wanna be back by six s[o ] ma:ybe no:t
09 Jan: [SIX!] 
(3)  Crouch 7 06:54
(Linda: mother; Katherine: daughter, aged five)
01 Lin: <righ> Katheri:ne? 
02 (0.5) 
03 → Lin: [I want you to eat your fruit in your] 
04 Lin: [((pours milk into Anna’s bowl)) ] 
05 Lin: [lunchbox today ]
06 Lin: [((looks at Katherine)) ]
07 (0.9)
In each of the arrowed turns instructions regarding the recipient’s conduct are 
given. In Extracts (1) and (2), the recipients are instructed to be back home by a 
particular time and in Extract (3), Katherine is told to eat the fruit in her lunch box 
at school that day. Certain specific circumstances are likely to have an influence 
on the construction of turn types in this particular environment. First, there are 
contingencies which must be managed when issuing instructions to another 
 regarding something that is their business. Second, as the projected course of 
 action is to happen when the speaker will not be present there is no way of moni-
toring whether the recipient will carry out the action and no means to force an 
unwilling recipient to do so (cf. Landqvist 2005). However, there are resources 
available to speakers which increase the likelihood of compliance. First, within 
my collection of directives constructed using I want, the relationship between 
speaker and recipient is always asymmetrical in terms of relative deontic author-
ity within the family unit. There were no examples within the data corpus of chil-
dren involving themselves in another’s business with an I want construction. If 
we imagine a child doing that, it sounds rebellious, a usurpation of the direction 
of parental authority. Thus the speaker can increase the likelihood of compliance 
by mobilizing the recipient’s obligation to them through the invocation of author-
ity and entitlement. Second, speakers can maintain civil relations with a recipi-
ent when involving themselves in another’s business by orienting to the projected 
action as the recipient’s business. This is done by building directives as a “my-side 
telling” (Pomerantz 1980). According to Pomerantz, by telling “their side” of 
some relevant matter, speakers may fish for a response rather than directly asking 
and in doing so display an orientation to the matter as the recipient’s business. By 
building directives in this way, speakers display an orientation to the matter as 
something which the recipient has primary responsibility of fulfilling. Further, 
the I want format generates an environment where the want may be satisfied, or 
not. On the surface, the possibility that the projected action will not be carried 
out is allowed for. 
Note that none of the examples here uses an imperative format. For example 
the directive in Extract (1) is built:
 oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt I want you to be ba:ck here by six.
It is not built using an imperative such as:
oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt be ba:ck here by six.
That is, the example in Extract (1) does not build a directive by formally, or in 
speech act terms, directly telling Kevin and Grant to be back by six. 
We can also note that none of the examples are built using an interrogative 
format. Extract (1) was not built:
oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt can you be ba:ck here by six.
That is, Extract (1) does not build a request using an interrogative format ad-
dressed to Kevin and Grant regarding their ability to be back by six. As a declara-
tive, the turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response and so does not propose 
either of these as a possibility. 
Directives built using I want, then, are Janus-faced and on the one hand 
strengthen the recipient’s obligation to comply by invoking authority and entitle-
ment, while on the other hand orienting to optionality and appearing to give the 
recipient a way out. In the following sections I consider each of these two features 
in turn. 
2.1.2  I want mobilizes recipients’ obligation to comply
Building a directive using I want invokes authority and reflects speakers’ orienta-
tions to their entitlement to issue a directive. Entitlement is “pointedly displayed 
by not orienting to any possibility of the request not being granted” (Curl and 
Drew 2008: 145). This lack of orientation can clearly be seen in the following ex-
tract. The previous night Tom and his sister were involved in a physical fight while 
they were alone in the house. 
(4) 2008 3 29:30
(Simon: father; Tom: son, aged fifteen)
01 Sim:   you’re in trouble mate.
02 (1.0)
03 Sim:  about last ni:ght.
04 (1.0)
05 Sim: ((starts pointing at Tom))
06 → Sim:  I want you home on the fi:rst bu:s,(.) not 
07  the second bu:s,
08  (0.4)
09 Sim:  okay¿
10 (0.2)
11 Sim:  no skateboard to schoo:l,
12 (0.5)
13 → Sim:  I wanna check your bag before you go to
14 schoo:l, 
15 (1.0)
16 Sim: [((stops pointing at Tom and steps towards him))]
17 Sim: [you’re in trouble. ]
18 Sim: ((pushes Tom’s bedroom door open further))
The target turn at lines 6 and 7 has a clear sense of telling rather than asking. The 
turn at lines 1–3 “you’re in trouble mate.” invokes Simon’s relative deontic author-
ity. Tom is “in trouble”, a notion which implies some sort of punishment. As 
 Simon’s father, presumably Simon will administer this punishment. This turn 
also deletes Tom’s agency and choice with respect to the events that are to follow. 
Note the turn “I want you home on the fi:rst bu:s,(.) not the second bu:s,” is built 
as a declarative format. It is not built as an interrogative such as “can you get the 
first bus home?” which treats compliance with the request as contingent on the 
recipient’s willingness, ability, or capacity to comply (Vine 2009). Requests built 
in this way can be refused (Craven and Potter 2010) as yes or no are available as 
possible response options (Raymond 2003). As a declarative I want does not for-
mally solicit a yes/no response and so proposes either of these as a possibility. 
A further feature of the construction of this turn, which distinguishes this 
from a typical directive, is that I want indexes the speaker, further invoking 
 Simon’s relative deontic authority as his “wants” are treated as a sufficient basis 
for Tom to comply. Whereas request forms built using a modal such as “can you?”, 
index the recipient, and directives tell the recipient to do something without 
 giving a basis for doing so, here the I want construction indexes the speaker, as 
 Simon’s “wants” are provided as the basis upon which Tom must comply, which 
further enhances the display of entitlement. 
Note the turn at lines 13 and 14 which is an implicit directive embedded with-
in a directive sequence. This appears to be a deviant case as the form used does 
not grammatically present the action as one which Tom, as the recipient, will 
carry out. Formally, grammatically, the turn differs from that at lines 6 and 7, 
where “you” expresses the agent of the future action. However, as Edwards notes 
“the very notion of an intention to do something, as something worth formulat-
ing, makes relevant a potential gap between thought and action” (2008: 180, 
original emphasis). Thus if Simon were simply able to check Tom’s bag, he would 
do so. By stating that Simon “wants” to check the bag, as something worth formu-
lating, displays an orientation to the notion that the projected action requires an 
action on Tom’s part. Although semantically “I wanna check your bag before you 
go to schoo:l,” refers to a future action that the speaker will carry out, its function 
is not to simply inform Tom of Simon’s “wants” but to request that Tom show Si-
mon his bag before leaving the house. 
2.1.3  Reporting a want as a fishing device
So far it has been noted that rather than ask recipients to do something, I want 
constructions are used to build directives that tell recipients to carry out an ac-
tion. These formats embody high entitlement as the recipient is treated as obliged 
to carry out the projected course of action on the basis of what the speaker 
wants. However, the I want format changes the grammar of the turn so that for-
mally the recipient is not being told what to do. Rather the speaker’s want is sim-
ply reported which generates an environment where it may be fulfilled or not, 
which (on the literal surface at least) allows for the possibility that the projected 
action may not be carried out. We can see then that directives built using I want 
are Janus-faced and are produced as if they are refusable when in fact, norma-
tively, they are not. 
An initial orientation to optionality that is closed down once the directive is 
reissued can be seen clearly in Extract (5) in which Grant is about to leave the 
house with a friend and is told by his mother, Pat, to be back by six o clock. 
(5)  AAFE3 26:58
(Pat: mother; Grant: son, aged seventeen)
01 Pat: [((walks into room and puts hand on hip))]
02 Gra: [let’s get moving o:n ]
03 → Pat: oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt I want you to be 
04 ba:ck here by six.
05 (.)
06 Pat: ri:ght?
07 (.) 
08 Mar: [((walks past Pat out of room))]
09 (Mar): [ri:ght. ]
10 Kev: I’m not going any(way,) ((out of camera shot))
11 Gra: [((runs past Pat out of room)) ]
12 Pat: [you’re no:t goi:ng ↓good.↓ o:kay,]
13 Pat: |((walks towards door, following Grant))|
14 | (0.2)  |
15 Pat: Gra:nt 
16 (.)
17 (Mic): (ye:s) 
18 Pat: GRANT? 
19 Gra: yea::h
20 Pat: [((stands in doorway looking at Grant)) ]
21 Pat: [YOU BE BACK HERE BY ↑SIX↑ O CLO:CK.  ]
22 (0.2)
23 Gra: I’ll be ba:ck here as soon as possible.
24 (.) 
25 Pat: ohkay. 
26 Gra: ah say po see
At the start of the extract Pat walks into the room as Grant is about to leave the 
house “let’s get moving o:n”. Note the turn at lines 3 and 4 is not built as an im-
perative “Kevin and Grant be back here by six” and so grammatically and for-
mally does not tell the recipients to do something. Rather Pat’s want is simply re-
ported. There is an ostensible allowance for optionality, “a potential gap between 
thought and action” (Edwards 2008: 180) as this want may be fulfilled or not. Fol-
lowing a slight gap (line 5) a response is pursued with the incremental “ri:ght?”, 
an attached interrogative clause with positive polarity which projects a “yes”. We 
can see that the ostensible orientation to optionality, and the gap between the 
“wanting” and its realization is closed down as a “yes” response is pursued. Fol-
lowing a sequence during which it is determined that Kevin will not be leaving 
the house anyway (lines 10–12), Pat pursues a response from Grant (lines 15, 18) 
who has begun to leave the house. In his turn at line 19, Grant responds to the 
summons “yea::h” rather than provide the response to the directive which is be-
ing pursued. The directive is then redone using an upgraded imperative format 
“YOU BE BACK HERE BY ↑SIX↑ O CLO:CK.” which restricts Grant’s response op-
tions solely to compliance. The pattern that we see in this example is a move from 
a report of Pat’s “wants” that orients at least notionally to optionality, to an inter-
rogative which projects a “yes”, to an upgraded imperative form that does not 
project the possibility of refusal. As Craven and Potter note, this lack of acknowl-
edgement of the recipient’s right not to comply is typical as repeat directives 
 typically “upgrade the issuer’s entitlement and downgrade the recipient’s contin-
gency” (2010: 8). In sum, the gap between thought and action and the possibility 
that the wanting may be satisfied or not, is closed down. 
2.1.4  Summary
Extracts (1) to (5) are typical instances of how I want formatted directives are con-
structed in the family mealtime data. First, these directives are formulated to in-
voke authority and entitlement as the recipient is treated as obliged to carry out 
the projected action on the basis of what the speaker wants. On the other hand, 
the I want construction changes the grammar of the turn so that formally the re-
cipient is not being told what to do. Rather, the speaker’s want is simply reported 
which generates an environment where it may be satisfied, or not. I want for-
matted directives, then, are Janus-faced and work to increase the likelihood of 
compliance when building deferred action directives by invoking authority and 
entitlement, while ostensibly orienting to optionality and appearing to give the 
recipient a way out. 
2.2  I need formatted requests
In contrast to the I want formatted directives discussed above, the examples in 
this section, built using I need, directly ask for something, rather than tell some-
one to do something. There are fifteen candidate requests built using I need in the 
data corpus. I outline one recurrent environment in which these requests occur 
which is following a request or directive from an interlocutor where they are con-
structed as a prerequisite to compliance with the base first pair part (FPP).
2.2.1  I need as a prerequisite to compliance
Extracts (6)–(8) provide some examples of requests following a request or direc-
tive from an interlocutor. 
(6) Potts 5 09:10
(Don: father; Wayne: son, aged ten)
01 Don: ((passes napkin to Wayne))
02 Way: ↑what tha:t for↑
03 (1.0)
04 Jud: wipe yer fa:ce on
05 (1.0) 
06 → Don: [£for wiping your a:rse on after.£]
07 Don: [((takes napkin out of packet)) ]
08 (1.2)
09 Way: °°(  ) (after)°°
10 (0.1)
11 Don: wipin’ th’a:rse on ((singsong voice))
12 (2.3)
13 → Way: need some mo:re 
14  (1.2)
15 Don: what for wiping th’a(h)ss o(h)n 
16 |(1.2) |
17 Way: |((smiles and nods at Don))|
18 Way: [whole pa:ck ]
19 Way: [((glances at Don))]
20 (0.2)
21 Don: wha?
22 Way: ( ) a [whole pa:ck ]
23 Jam: I[’m not eating tha]t bit its all gristle  
24 Don: ((puts pack of napkins on table next to Wayne))
(7)  Potts 3 08:00
(Judy: mother; Wayne: son, aged ten)
01 → Jud: you’re not going anywhe:re so you might as well 
02 eat ‘um               
03 (2.2)
04 → Way: I nee- I nuh nee:d a dri:nk?
05  Jud: |((cuts up food on plate))|
06 |(2.1) |
07 Jud: cah- ↓get a drink of water.↓
(8) AAF7 04:22
(Pat: mother; Kevin: son, aged eighteen)
01 → Pat: [mm gonna get your hair cut today?]
02  Pat: [((looks at Kevin)) ]
03 Kev: huhu:m 
04 Pat: a:h
05 (0.5)
06 Bil: tri::m=
07 → Kev: =I need mone:y 
In each of the arrowed turns some aspect of the recipient’s conduct is specified. 
In the first extract, albeit in a manner which is oriented to as “non-serious,” Don 
instructs Wayne to wipe his “arse” on a napkin, with a non-ironic instruction at 
line 4, which is “wipe yer fa:ce on”. In the second extract Judy directs Wayne to 
eat his left-over food and to remain sitting at the dinner table. In the final example 
Pat requests that her son Grant get his hair cut. The kinds of instructions given to 
recipients in these extracts are built using various turn types and at various posi-
tions within turn construction units. Although there is diversity in the content 
and sequential positioning of these turns, it is recognizable that each directs 
some aspect of the recipient’s conduct. In each example the request or directive is 
responded to with a need construction that launches a further request sequence 
(the example in Extract [6] is produced without the personal pronoun I, leaving 
open the possibility that we, the family, will need more napkins). Note that none 
of the examples here use an interrogative format. The request in Extract (6), for 
example, is built 
need some mo:re
It is not built with an interrogative form such as 
can you give some mo:re
Rather than a request which solicits a yes/no response and which is contingent on 
the recipient’s willingness or ability to comply (Vine 2009), speakers display en-
titlement to make these requests on the basis of their positioning as a prerequisite 
to compliance with the base request. This matter will be discussed further below 
as I turn to Extracts (9) (an extended version of Extract [7]) and (10) (an extended 
version of Extract [8]) and examine the practice in further detail. 
(9) Potts 3 08:00
(Judy: mother; Don: father; Wayne: son, aged ten)
01   (14.0)
02 Way: ((puts down knife and fork))
03 Jud: well you can eat the:m two,
04 |(1.8) |
05 Way: |((shakes head))| 
06 Jam: he’dint even one. 
07 |(3.5) |
08 Don: |((looks at Wayne and chews))|
09 Don: ri::ght you’re not leaving them are you
10 Way: ↑heh hum! hh↑
11 (0.8)
12 Don: ↑s’up wi’yer↑
13 (1.2)
14 Jud: [((speaks with mouthful of food))]
15 Jud: [you’re not going anywhe:re so you might as well 
16 eat ‘um ]
17 (2.2)
18 → Way: I nee- I nuh nee:d a dri:nk?
19 Jud: |((cuts up food on plate))|
20 |(2.1) |
21 Jud: cah- ↓get a drink of water.↓
22 Don: just have a toma:to. 
23 Way: |((turns around, reaches in cupboard for glass))|
24 |(0.8) |
At line 3, in response to Wayne putting down his fork, appearing to have finished 
eating, Judy tells him to eat more. At line 9, in a turn which is responsive to, but 
deletes Wayne having shaken his head to indicate that he is resisting and will not 
be eating more, Don delivers the turn “you’re not leaving them are you”, which, 
formulated as a negative interrogative, prefers a no response (Heritage 2002), or 
confirmation that Wayne will not be leaving his food. Following laughter from 
Wayne, Don produces a further objection with a wh-formatted interrogative which 
can be heard as challenging (Koshik 2003) as he displays puzzlement regarding 
Wayne’s actions; “↑s’up wi’yer↑” (‘what’s up with you’). Judy then issues her 
second directive in the sequence, “you’re not going anywhe:re so you might as 
well eat ‘um” (lines 15 and 16). 
Within this sequence, then, there are various attempts to persuade Wayne to 
eat more food. In response to Judy’s directive at lines 15 and 16 Wayne delivers the 
target turn “I nee- I nuh nee:d a dri:nk?”. Note that this turn is not built as an in-
terrogative (“can I have a drink?”) but as a reporting in which Wayne literally, 
grammatically, merely reports some circumstance, rather than making an explic-
it request that requires a granting or a rejection. The turn is built as an upshot of 
the preceding talk. Wayne has been directed to stay at the table and to eat more 
food and his request is formulated as an upshot of these instructions. The turn is 
promissory in nature as it aligns with the instructions to stay at the table and 
highlights a precondition for him to comply; he needs a drink and must acquire 
one in order to stay at the table for a further period of time. As a declarative, the 
turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response and so proposes either of these as 
a possibility. Rather than functioning as a straightforward request that may either 
be granted or rejected, the obligation of the recipient to comply is strengthened 
by virtue of the turn’s positioning as a prerequisite to compliance with the base 
request. As Schegloff (2007: 99) notes, insert sequences are promissory in nature 
as they are “understood to have been launched to address matters which need to 
be dealt with in order to enable the doing of the base second pair part. They proj-
ect the doing of that second pair part upon completion of the preliminary work.” 
That is, compliance with Judy’s directive (remain sitting at the table, eat fur-
ther  food) is projected once Wayne has been granted permission to leave the 
 table momentarily to retrieve a drink. The turn is hearable as a request in part due 
to this sequential positioning as it is built as an upshot of the directive to stay at 
the table. Judy treats the turn as a request for permission to leave the table 
 momentarily as she grants permission for Wayne to do so “cah- ↓get a drink of 
water.↓”. 
The central observation on which the rest of the analysis hinges is the recipi-
ent’s use of an I need construction following a directive from an interlocutor as 
a way of introducing a precondition to compliance. The turn is built as an upshot 
of the preceding talk and so, due to the promissory nature of insert sequences 
(Schegloff 2007), the obligation of the recipient to comply is strengthened, as the 
“needed” object is formulated as a precondition to compliance with the recipi-
ent’s own prior request. 
Let us consider a further example. Pat and her daughter Michelle are sitting 
in the car, about to leave the family home for several months. Husband Bill and 
their sons Kevin and Grant are saying goodbye. 
(10) AAF7 04:30
(Pat: mother; Bill: father; Kevin: son, aged eighteen)
01 Pat: [mm gonna get your hair cut today?]
02 Pat: [((looks at Kevin)) ] 
03 Kev: huhu:m 
04 Pat: a:h
05 (0.5)
06 Bil: tri::m=
07 → Kev:  =I need mone:y 
08  (.)
09 Kev: its gonna cost fifty dolla:rs. 
10 (.)
11 Pat: ↑li[sten take- ] take your↑ picture and 
12 Kev: [for a good ba:rber]
13 Pat: =send it to me plea:se,
14 Kev: heh HE::H HEH. 
15 (0.4)
16 Kev: .h[hh! ]
17 Pat: >[will you do] tha:t<
18 Kev: o:h oka:y 
19 (0.2)
20 Mic: WE ALL wanna see what it looks like. 
The sequence initial request concerns whether Kevin will be getting his hair cut 
later that day. As an affirmative-polarity yes/no interrogative this turn projects a 
yes response (Raymond 2003) which would imply compliance with it as a request. 
At line 3, Kevin responds with a weak agreement form (Pomerantz 1975). The turn 
is not built as an explicit yes, and is thus open for revision. Following Pat’s receipt 
of this response (line 4) where the sequence is brought to possible closure, Bill 
further specifies and reopens the request as he indicates the kind of haircut that 
Grant should have “tri::m=”. 
As an action “I need mone:y” accomplishes requesting. One feature which 
denotes this action import is that Kevin’s co-interactants, Pat and Bill, are in a 
position to grant the request and to provide Kevin with the money. Indeed,  Kevin’s 
request for money makes this a condition for him doing so. A second evidential 
feature is the turn’s sequential positioning. Similarly to Extract (7), the request is 
produced as an upshot of the preceding talk, as something which has emerged 
interactionally rather than something which was previously on the agenda. That 
is, Kevin is not simply requesting money for any old thing, nor simply stating that 
he needs money “out of the blue”. Kevin goes on to further specify the request “its 
gonna cost fifty dolla:rs.” and provides an account which justifies this “for a good 
ba:rber”. Although the request is not explicitly either granted or rejected, it is 
treated as one which is “no problem”. This is evidenced as Pat requests that Kevin 
send her a picture of his haircut (lines 12, 14) and so the haircut is treated as done. 
In the space where one would expect the pursuit of a response to the request, 
Kevin agrees to send Pat a picture (line 18). That is, the lack of explicit response 
is not treated as problematic as the haircut, and the provision of money to pay 
for a “good barber” is treated as done. One key feature of the I need construc-
tion is that not only will the granting of this request enable the base request to 
be  granted, but it will allow more effective compliance. Kevin “needs” money 
not only to  comply, but a specific amount of money to get his hair cut by a “good 
barber”. This renders an otherwise potentially disruptive intervention an affilia-
tive one. 
2.2.2  Summary
One major sequential environment in which I need formatted requests occur is 
following a request or directive from an interlocutor, where the I need formulated 
request is inserted as a prerequisite to compliance. Grammatically I need con-
structions do not on their own accomplish requesting but are hearable as re-
quests in part due to their sequential positioning where they introduce a precon-
dition to compliance with a base request. The selection of this format builds 
requests as an upshot of the preceding talk, rather than something which was 
previously on the agenda. Due to the promissory nature of insert sequences, the 
obligation of the recipient to comply is strengthened due to this sequential posi-
tioning, building on the recipient’s commitment to having their own prior re-
quest  complied with. We can see that there is more than the semantics of the 
word need or the object of the request that contribute to the sense of these re-
quests as necessary. Rather, these turns gain their interactional potency from 
their sequential positioning as formulating a precondition to compliance with a 
base request.
3  Conclusions
This article has identified two main environments in which speakers use I want 
and I need constructions. In the first section I showed how speakers build direc-
tives with I want, demonstrating their interactional import in a specific sequential 
environment. I want formatted directives have two main features: 
1. I want constructions mobilize recipient’s obligation to comply by invoking
authority and entitlement. Non-compliance is not oriented to as a response
option.
2. Reporting “wants” index a potential gap between thought and action,
orienting to optionality and ostensibly allowing for the possibility that the
projected action may not be carried out.
Each of these features works in conjunction to manage the contingencies involved 
with issuing deferred action directives. On the one hand these constructions in-
crease the likelihood of compliance by invoking authority and entitlement. On 
the other hand an orientation to optionality works to maintain civil relations with 
the recipient. In sum, I want formatted directives are Janus-faced and as such tell 
recipients to do something while ostensibly orienting to optionality. 
In the second section I examined one environment in which speakers select 
need as a verb in request sequences, which is following a request or directive from 
an interlocutor. As insert sequences are promissory in nature (Schegloff 2007) 
here the recipient’s obligation to comply is strengthened by virtue of the turn’s 
positioning as a prerequisite to compliance with the base request. Rather than an 
intrinsic feature of the requested object, the turn gains its sense as something 
that is necessary from its sequential positioning as formulating a precondition to 
compliance with a base request.
Curl and Drew (2008) show that speakers preface requests with I wonder to 
display lack of entitlement to make a request and an understanding of the contin-
gencies involved in the granting of the request. In the analysis here we saw how 
directives built using an I want construction feature strong markers of entitle-
ment and little or no orientation to the contingencies involved in the speaker 
granting the request. If one considers requests on a continuum of contingency 
and entitlement as they suggest, high entitlement I want constructions are in-
versely linked to I wonder constructions. 
Let us now return to our broader issue of mental state terms and interac-
tion. Much of social cognitive research assumes that verbs such as want and need 
map onto internal referents and represent talk about the mind. Researchers are 
concerned with differentiating between uses of mental state terms which are 
 referential and those that are simply conversational (e.g., McElwain et al. 2011). 
Discursive psychology’s argument that mental state terms are objects with their 
own normative sequential environments and uses (Edwards 2006) is evident 
within the analysis of request and directive sequences offered here. When we 
 consider the sequentially specific nature of I want and I need constructions, it 
is  apparent that coding schemes which are designed to identify “genuine 
 references to psychological states” (Bartsch and Wellman 1995: 31) are inade-
quate as they do not take into account the intricacies of interaction and the action 
orientation of talk. Regardless of what a speaker may be thinking or feeling, 
speakers may state that they want or need something in specific sequential con-
texts to accomplish particular actions. What we see in these materials are verbs 
that are understood within social cognitive research as “desire terms” (Hughes 
et  al. 2007; Moissinac and Budwig 2000), as resources that are drawn on by 
 speakers in everyday talk and interaction. Viewed in this way, the uses of these 
terms become an interactional matter rather than a window into the developing 
mind. 
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Appendix: transcription notation
The transcription system used is based on that developed by Gail Jefferson (see 
Atkinson and Heritage 1984). 
(0.8) Pauses are shown by the tenth of the second in brackets.
(.) A micropause, which is too short to measure. 
= Equal signs denote the immediate latching of successive talk.
[ ] Square brackets indicate the beginning and end of overlapping 
speech. 
| | Straight lines indicate the beginning and ending of overlap with 
actions
((walks)) Double parentheses within italics denote actions.
↓ ↑ Vertical arrows precede notable pitch changes. 
Underlining Denotes emphasis – the location of underlining within a word 
locates emphasis and also indicates how heavy it is. 
CAPITALS Indicate words which are notably louder than the surrounding 
speech. 
°i know° Degree signs enclose words which are notably quieter than the 
surrounding speech. 
I do::nt know Colons indicate that the preceding sound is elongated. More 
 colons denote more elongation. 
hhhh Outbreath. As with colons, this is proportionate. 
.hhhh Inbreath, proportionate. 
really? Question marks indicate a “questioning” intonation. 
no, Commas mark weak rising intonation. 
really¿ Inverted question marks indicate a rise stronger than a comma, 
but weaker than a question mark. 
no. A full stop denotes a falling intonation. 
! Exclamation points indicate animated intonation.
>really< Arrow brackets enclose talk which is delivered at a notably  faster
pace.
<really> Arrow brackets which point away from talk indicate that speech
is delivered at a notably slower pace.
heh heh Laughter. 
st(h)o(h)p i(h)t h’s in brackets signal laughter within speech. 
£ Denotes “smiley voice.” 
bu-u- Hyphens indicate a “cut off” of the preceding sound. 
(guess) Words within round brackets indicate uncertain transcription. 
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